- One has an obligation not to engage in collectively harmful activities when refraining from such activities does not impose significant personal costs.
- To cast an unexcused harmful vote is to engage in a collectively harmful activity, while abstaining imposes low personal costs.
- Therefore, one should not cast an unexcused harmful vote.
This argument is very similar to one given by Alexander Pruss. In his book One Body, Pruss writes:
The significant number of children born outside of marriage in this country might arguably be a major contributor to poverty, poorer moral education, and other social ills. By engaging in premarital sex, one takes the risk of being a contributor to this serious social problem. It is true that, more likely than not, procreation will not happen in any given act. However, a significant number of children born outside of marriage are conceived despite the use of contraception. Thus, even engaging in contraceptive intercourse, one is risking being a contributor to the problem. And there one is at least presumptively doing wrong. (2013, 187)
Brennan’s principle concerning collectively harmful activities provides a useful way of precisifying this argument. It also provides a way of extending the argument beyond premarital sex to include other potentially wrongful behaviors. The use of pornography is a very plausible candidate: the porn industry is utterly rife with abuse and trafficking, and its proliferation has plausibly contributed to the general loosening of sexual morals in our society (which in turn makes it a contributor to the premarital sex problem). Furthermore, pornography use is correlated with lower levels of relationship satisfaction. Given all of this, it very plausibly constitutes a CHA. Since refraining from pornography use carries no significant personal costs, it follows that there is a moral obligation not to use pornography.
For theists, there is another potential dimension to this argument: even if one does not think that the aforementioned considerations suffice to show the intrinsic wrongness of non-marital sexual activity, they plausibly do suffice to give God very strong reason to prohibit such activity. This fits nicely with the accounts of Christian sexual morality given by e.g. Murphy (2002) and Swinburne (2007).
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